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Objectives: This study examines the impact of alcohol consumption in a Major League Baseball (MLB) 
stadium on area level counts of crime. The modal practice at MLB stadiums is to stop selling alcoholic 
beverages after the seventh inning. Baseball is not a timed game, so the duration between end of the 
seventh inning (last call for alcohol) and the end of the game varies considerably, providing a unique 
natural experiment that allows us to estimate the relationship between alcohol consumption and crime 
near a stadium on game days to non-game days and to areas around sports bars that fans also frequent 
but are not subject to alcohol restrictions after the seventh inning.    
 
Methods: Crime data were obtained from Philadelphia for the period 2006-2015 and geocoded to the 
area around the MLB stadium as well as popular sports bars. We rely on difference-in-differences 
regression models to estimate the change in crime on home game days around the stadium as the game 
time extends into extra innings to other areas of the city and around sports bars in Philadelphia relative 
to days when the baseball team plays away from home.   
 
Results: We found that when there are extra innings and more game-time after the seventh inning 
alcohol sales stoppage crime declines significantly around the stadium. The effects are largely driven by 
a reduction in assaults. The crime reduction benefit of the last call alcohol policy is undone when a 
complex of sports bars opens in the stadium parking lot in 2012. The results suggest that alcohol 
consumption during baseball games is a contributor to crime. 
 
Conclusions: The findings provide further support for environmental theories of crime that note the 
congregation of people in places with excessive alcohol consumption is a generator of violent crime in 
cities. The consumption of alcohol in MLB stadiums appears to increase opportunities for people to get 
swept up into fights.    
 




1 We thank Jake Klick for excellent research assistance.  We also thank Jonah Gelbach, Paul Heaton, Greg 
Ridgeway, and participants in the Penn Law Faculty and the Rotterdam Institute for Law and Economics workshops 
for comments.  This work was funded by a grant from the Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration of Justice. 





A growing body of literature finds that alcohol consumption is a contributor to crime (Carpenter 
& Dobkin, 2011). Excessive alcohol consumption, for example, influences cognition and suppresses 
moral prohibitions that act as inhibitors of aggression (Exum, 2002). Alcohol consumption may also 
place individuals who drink in excess at greater risk for victimization, as criminal offenders may see 
inebriated people as easier targets for robbery and assault (Sherman, 1992). The consumption of alcohol 
in group settings may also fuel crime by increasing the number of social contacts, making people more 
talkative and increasing social interactions between motivated offenders and victims (Carpenter & 
Dobkin, 2011). In general, evidence suggests that alcohol increases the risk of crime through offender, 
victim, and group setting channels.  
It is not surprising then that alcohol-reduction policies have long been part of public health 
campaigns to reduce accidents, injuries, and violent crimes associated with its use (Fagan, 1990). The 
primary public policy approaches to reducing alcohol consumption have been to raise prices by imposing 
excise taxes on alcohol beverages, setting minimum age restrictions on the purchase and consumption 
of alcohol, limiting the times (hours and days of week) when alcohol beverages can be sold, and 
regulating the places where alcohol can be sold and consumed in public settings (Carpenter & Dobkin, 
2011).     
While carefully done studies of alcohol restrictions around places generally suggest that 
reducing alcohol consumption lowers interpersonal crimes, these studies face standard identification 
problems. The place and time restrictions, for example, are often set up in response to concerns with 
crime and other negative externalities, or they may be implemented as part of a broader effort to curb 
the connection between alcohol and crime. Restrictions to close bars and taverns at earlier times of the 
day, or on given days of the week, are often a result of a concern with the crime and disorder facilitated 
at given locations that are hot spots for crime (Sherman, 1992).  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3567418
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In England and Wales, for example, in 2005 the government removed restrictions on the closing 
time for bars to reduce crowding of intoxicated individuals on streets that were thought to be a primary 
contributor to assaults (Humprheys & Eisner, 2010). More generally, regulations that seek to reduce 
consumption of alcohol in specific places may be endogenously related to concerns with crime and 
other negative externalities of excessive alcohol use. At the same time, there is an appreciable amount 
of literature suggesting that alcohol consumption in group settings, like sporting events, may be crime 
generators.   
In this paper, we examine the impact of alcohol consumption during Major League Baseball 
(MLB) games on crime around a sports stadium. We rely on a novel natural experiment to provide 
credible estimates of the impact of alcohol consumption during MLB games on crime near a stadium. 
The MLB practice of ceasing to sell beer and other alcoholic beverages in stadiums at the end of the 
seventh inning provides an especially useful natural experiment to examine the impact of alcohol 
consumption on crime, because baseball is not a timed game. The game duration from the end of the 
seventh inning to the end of the game can be short or long. An inning could be as short as six pitches or 
it could go on indefinitely. Further, since there are no ties in MLB games, games can be as short as eight 
and a half innings or can go into effectively unlimited extra innings. This aspect of MLB games allows us 
to examine a wide range of time spans during which spectators are limited in their ability to drink 
alcohol. Thus, we can compare game days with non-game days when the game is at home or away, and 
when the time from the end of the seventh inning extends and fans who are in attendance are more 
likely to sober up. 
We examine Philadelphia Phillies games because the Citizens Bank Park (CBP) stadium provides 
an additional quasi-experiment for us to exploit. In March 2012, the Xfinity Live!2 complex opened in the 
stadium parking lot. This entertainment venue contains several bars and restaurants that sell alcohol 
 
2 See https://www.xfinitylive.com  
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until 2 a.m. each evening, effectively undoing any potential effect of the alcohol sale stoppage in the 
stadium at the end of the seventh inning. 
We find that games that are relatively lengthy after the seventh inning and games with extra 
innings generate lower crime around CBP, as compared to other areas around the city. For the average 
game, it appears that the alcohol sales restriction reduces assaults by around 50 percent. These effects 
are concentrated within the first hour after the game, with little additional crime reduction occurring 
after that, and in a relatively small area around CBP. We do not observe similar effects around a 
selection of popular sports bars in other areas of the city where no seventh inning restriction on alcohol 
sales applies. These effects largely vanish after the Xfinity Live! complex opened and allowed fans to 
continue to drink alcohol after the seventh inning in the stadium parking lot, further suggesting the link 
between the stadium alcohol restrictions and crime is causal. 
In the following sections we briefly highlight prior literature on the effects of age, time, and 
place-based alcohol restrictions and sporting events on crime. We then discuss how theories of 
environmental criminology explain the mechanism through which alcohol consumption in places that 
gather people for legitimate social contact generates crime. This section is followed by an explanation of 
our unique methodology for identifying the effect of alcohol sales on crime during baseball games. Our 
results and analyses follow. Finally, we discuss the implications of this research for theories on 
criminality of places and crime prevention policy.    
 
Age, Time, and Place Restrictions on Alcohol 
 
Alcohol has long been thought to be a contributor to violent crime, with the most pronounced 
effects being for assaults. However, the historical empirical evidence for the physiological effects of 
intoxication as a direct cause of aggression has not be particularly convincing (see Fagan, 1990 for a 
review). More recently, scholars have turned to examining the impact of different alcohol restriction 
policies on crime. Studies have examined the effect of excise taxes imposed on alcohol sales, minimum 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3567418
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age of alcohol access restrictions, and spatial/temporal restriction of alcohol availability. Multiple 
studies show when excise taxes on alcohol are raised alcohol consumption and violent crime drops 
(Cook & Moore, 2001; Cook & Moore, 1993; Matthews et al., 2006; Sivarajasingam et al., 2006). This 
literature is, however, limited because states seldom change excise tax rates on alcohol, so most of 
these effects are estimated from cross-sectional differences in taxes between states (see Cook & 
Durrance, 2013 for an exception).   
The empirical evidence of link between alcohol consumption and crime is the strongest from 
studies that examine age restrictions. Studies have taken advantage of the fact that the minimum 
alcohol drinking age of 21 in the United States is the only policy that discretely impacts people at this 
age.  Several carefully done studies find that alcohol consumption jumps sharply at age 21 (see 
Carpenter & Dobkin, 2001 for a review). Carpenter and Dobkin (2015), for example, find that arrests in 
California jump by a significant 6% for individuals after turning age 21. This increase in arrests is mostly 
attributable to a rise in assaults, alcohol-related offenses, and nuisance crimes.   
Studies on time and place restrictions also find that limiting alcohol sales to given times (days or 
hours of operation) and places also reduces crime (Carpenter & Dobkin, 2011). Several studies have 
capitalized on natural experiments and examined what happens when there is a change in the times 
when alcohol can be sold, or the locations of alcohol establishments. Olsson and Wikstrom (1982) find 
that a 3-month prohibition of Saturday sales of alcohol in state-run liquor stores in Sweden reduced 
weekend public-order crimes, domestic disturbances, and assaults. Norstrom and Skog (2005), in a 
follow-up study, find that the repeal of the Saturday alcohol-sales ban in Sweden had no impact on 
assaults on Saturdays, despite a clear increase in alcohol sales. However, the number of assaults was so 
low at the time that this study may have been underpowered to detect effects. More recently, Heaton 
(2012) finds that the repeal of the Sunday alcohol-sales ban that was applied to only a set of jurisdictions 
in Virginia in 2004 and 2008 led to significant increases in minor and serious alcohol-related crimes on 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3567418
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Sundays. The increase in alcohol-related offenses on Sunday also occurred in the afternoon when stores 
were open, suggesting that it is the consumption of alcohol shortly after stores open that generates the 
additional crime. Han et al. (2016), however, show that the lifting of Sunday sales prohibitions on 
alcohol in state-run stores in Pennsylvania has only a modest impact on crime in high poverty 
neighborhoods in Philadelphia.   
Although the density and location of alcohol outlets are a known correlate of violent crime 
(Weisburd et al., 2012), most studies of alcohol outlets and violence are cross sectional. There are, 
however, a growing number of studies that examine what happens to crime after the opening or closing 
of alcohol outlets. Teh (2008), for example, finds that the opening of alcohol outlets in Los Angeles was 
associated with an increase in crimes around stores located in high poverty neighborhoods. Anderson et 
al. (2016) find that law changes in counties in Kansas that lifted prohibitions of selling alcohol to the 
public for on-premise consumption was associated with an increase in violent crime. The increase in 
violent crime also appears to be largest in counties that do not require a percentage of food to be sold 
at a bar, suggesting that the consumption of alcohol in bars is the primary contributor to the increase in 
violent crime. Evidence that opening bars is associated with an increase in violent crime is consistent 
with the widely-shared belief in criminology that bars are a common feature of violent crime hot spots 
in cities (Sherman et al., 1989; Weisburd et al., 2012; Ratcliffe, 2015; Tillyer, Wilcox, & Walter, 2020).   
Large social events that involve alcohol consumption are also associated with increased risk of 
crime. Research on crime around college football stadiums, for example, shows that arrests for assaults 
and disorder offenses increase significantly on game days (Rees & Schepel, 2009; Merlo et al., 2010). 
Several studies also find that crime increases in areas surrounding sports stadiums on home game days 
(Billings & Depken, 2011; Kurland, 2014; Marie, 2016; Kurkland & Johnson, 2019), when a stadium is 
present versus torn down (Vandeviver et al., 2019), and on days that sport stadiums are used 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3567418
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(Campaniello, 2013; Munyo & Rossi, 2013).3  Kurkland and Johnson (2019), for example, examine 
changes in crime levels around five soccer stadiums in the United Kingdom. They find that crime is 
higher on game days than other days of the week, and that the increase in crime is highest in 
neighborhoods closer to the stadiums and those with bars or restaurants. 
While the presence of bars near sports stadiums appears to be a crime generator, studies on the 
criminality of places typically do not measure how crime varies with the availability of alcohol. The 
closest study that alludes to the link between alcohol consumption and crime around sporting events is 
Kurland and Johnson (2019), as they find that crime increases in neighborhoods with bars near soccer 
stadiums. However, this study cannot separate out the influence of alcohol consumption from the 
increase in the number of patrons who come to sports bars to watch the soccer games.   
In general, studies that examine the impact of sports stadiums on crime cannot separate out 
whether the sporting events impact interpersonal crimes like assaults because of gathering more people 
together, or because of the excessive alcohol consumption. At college football games, for example, 
alcohol sales are already generally banned in stadiums, so fans tend to drink alcohol just outside the 
stadium prior to the game and subvert the impact of sales restrictions. There are, however, 
criminological theories that explain why limiting alcohol sales in specific times and places may help 
thwart crime in settings that bring groups of people together for social contact.     
 
Environmental Criminology: Situational Opportunities Theories  
 
Environmental criminology provides a clear framework for understanding how the place in 
which alcohol is consumed can be a facilitator of crime (Wilcox & Gialopsos, 2015). Environmental 
criminology assumes that crime patterns in space are distributed according to how the environment of a 
place at a given time influences the volume and types of criminal opportunities. Theories that fall within 
 
3 Kurland and Johnson (2019) provide detailed review of this literature.   
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the framework of environmental criminology articulate mechanisms by which alcohol consumption in 
specific places may interact to generate crime.  
Alcohol consumption affects cognition and vulnerability. Impaired individuals, for example, are 
more likely to be aggressive or appear vulnerable to would-be offenders. Clarke’s (1995) situational 
crime prevention theory argues that offending may be influenced by alcohol consumption, as excessive 
alcohol consumption makes people myopic and may change their perceptions of the crime opportunity 
structure. This may be particularly true in the context of alcohol-fueled offenses such as assaults, where 
group dynamics of excessive drinking may lead to more potential opportunities for fights. Similarly, 
there may be dynamics of places at a given time of day (e.g., when bars close) where an increase in the 
number of inebriated people on the streets provides a target-rich environment for potential 
confrontations. Weisburd et al. (1992), for instance, find that calls about public drinking are one of the 
main correlates of robbery hot spots. Multiple studies find that excessive alcohol consumption prior to 
closing time and crowding in the streets after bars close are risk factors for assaults (Graham & Homel, 
2012). 
Cohen and Felson’s (1979) routine activity theory also explains how the movement of people 
between places influences the presence of motivate offenders, suitable targets, and guardianship to 
thwart crime. Alcohol consumed in social settings, like sports stadiums and bars, may create larger flows 
of inebriated people in the streets and provide more opportunities for robberies and assaults between 
people. Recreational drinking of alcohol at places where people gather to watch sporting events may 
also generate more public-order offenses and assaults by increasing the number of motivated offenders, 
as inhibitions against violence and disorderly behavior are lowered when people are intoxicated.   
Within the context of places themselves, crime pattern theory provides a clear typology for 
explaining how the activity patterns around places that gather people together for legitimate uses, like 
watching a sporting event in a bar or stadium, becomes a crime generator. As Brantingham and 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3567418
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Brantingham (1995) explain, sports stadiums and other venues that bring large numbers of people 
together for reasons “unrelated to any particular level of criminal motivation” can become crime 
generators by creating sufficient concentrations of people in a setting that allows people to “exploit 
criminal opportunities” (pp. 7-8). Intoxicated people in greater numbers near each other provide more 
available opportunities for interpersonal crimes like assaults, as drunk individuals get “swept up into 
fights” (p.11). Rowdy bars are particularly prone environments for assaults to occur (Graham et al., 
2006). 
In summary, environmental criminology perspectives suggest alcohol consumption in group 
settings may fuel crimes of interpersonal violence like assaults.  
 
Last Call for Alcohol Sales 
 
Although Major League Baseball (MLB) does not mandate rules regarding the sale of alcohol at 
individual sports stadiums, most MLB teams adopt a host of sales restrictions.4 The focus of this paper is 
the rule about when alcohol sales cease during baseball games. All MLB stadiums stop selling alcohol 
prior to the end of the game. The Philadelphia Phillies ballpark, Citizens Bank Park (CBP), ceases sales at 
the end of the seventh inning.5 This is the most common policy among MLB teams, though some stop 
sales as late as the end of the eighth inning (e.g., Baltimore Orioles for concession stand sales) and 
others as early as the middle of the seventh inning (e.g., New York Yankees for concession stand and 
hawker sales). Other alcohol restrictions include limits on how many alcoholic drinks an individual can 
purchase at a time (generally two, as is the case for the Phillies) and maximum cup sizes (24 oz. for the 
Phillies). 
 
4 Major League Baseball is a member of Team Coalition (along with the other major U.S. sports leagues) which 
does provide a list of best practices regarding alcohol sales.  See https://teamcoalition.org/training/policies/  
5 See https://fansdontletfansdrivedrunk.org/team/mlb/philadelphia-phillies/#1442768220251-8edb53aa-
bec4d832-ba39ff22-02f5 
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The logistics of an MLB baseball game seventh inning sales cut off creates quasi-randomization 
regarding how long people are prohibited from purchasing alcohol. Because baseball is not a timed 
game, the duration from the end of the seventh inning to the end of the game (when spectators 
generally leave the ballpark) is variable game-to-game.   
Putting aside games affected by rain delays (which we exclude from our analysis) which can 
cause a game to end during any inning, a baseball game can have as few as eight and a half innings 
(when the home team is winning after the visiting team bats in the top of the 9th inning) or can extend to 
effectively limitless innings since a baseball game cannot end in a tie.6 Beyond that, an inning itself has 
no fixed time duration, ending only after each team has recorded three outs. The minimum number of 
pitches that could end an inning is six, although that has not happened.7 On the other end of things, the 
number of pitches thrown in an inning is limitless. For example, in the top of the second inning in a July 
26, 1999 San Francisco Giants game, pitcher Russ Ortiz threw 63 pitches to retire the St. Louis Cardinals 
and then Jose Jimenez threw 32 pitches to retire the Giants in the bottom of the inning.8 In one 
instance, a pitcher threw 21 pitches to get a single batter out.9 Further, there is no restriction on how 
long it takes a pitcher to throw a pitch.10 
This variability inherent in the game of baseball allows us to examine changes in crime when 
spectators are prohibited from buying alcohol for a long period of time versus games where the 
prohibition ends up being quite short. Focusing on the Phillies CBP stadium also allows us to exploit an 
 
6 The longest game in MLB history was 25 innings and lasted eight hours and six minutes on May 8, 1984 between 
Chicago White Sox and the Milwaukee Brewers. 
7 There have been fewer than 200 total instances where an individual pitcher has thrown just three pitches in an 
inning, but none of these instances occurred in the same inning by two opposing pitchers.  See 
https://www.baseball-almanac.com/feats/3_pitch_inning.shtml 
8 https://www.baseball-reference.com/boxes/SFN/SFN199907260.shtml 
9 San Francisco Giant Brandon Belt faced a total of 21 pitches from Los Angeles Angels pitcher Jaime Barria in the 
1st inning of the April 22, 2018 match.  See https://www.baseball-reference.com/boxes/ANA/ANA201804220.shtml 
10 The advanced statistic PACE provides some measure of how fast pitchers work.  In some years, based on the 
PACE metric, the difference between the fastest and slowest working pitchers may be as much as 20 seconds per 
throw. 
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additional source of variation. In March of 2012, the Xfinity Live! entertainment complex was opened on 
the corner of Pattison Avenue and 11th Street directly opposite the Southwest corner of CBP, about 300 
feet from the ballpark gates in what was previously part of the stadium parking lot. 
Xfinity Live! includes, among other bars and restaurants, the Broad Street Bullies Pub and the 
Victory Beer Hall. These establishments serve alcohol nightly until 2 a.m. Because these places 
effectively undo the CBP seventh inning cut-off, as spectators can either leave a game early and walk 
0.05 miles to continue drinking or, if they stay in the ballpark for the final out, fans can easily resume 
drinking in what is basically the ballpark’s parking lot. Given this, if alcohol consumption in stadiums 
increases crime, we should see any effect of the ballpark alcohol cut off on crime diminish substantially 
after Xfinity Live! opens in the 2012 baseball season.      
 
Design and Empirical Methods 
 
In this study, we leverage the difference in crime around the Citizens Ball Park (CBP) in Philadelphia 
between 2006 and 2015 to examine the effect of alcohol consumption during baseball games on 
surrounding crime rates. To estimate the impact of alcohol consumption we employ a differences-in-
differences design, which compares changes in crime around CBP on home game days when they extend 
into extra innings to away game days and to other areas of Philadelphia not located near CBP. We 
estimate changes in total reported crime, assaults, theft, liquor violations, and disorderly conduct. We 
focus on these subcategories of total crime as they are most likely to be influenced by excessive alcohol 
consumption in stadiums. We construct the counts of crimes at different geographic units of analysis 
(Police Service Area, roadway network, and Census Block) for each day of observation. Our primary 
specification estimates the count of crime on a given game day within a specific geographic unit around 
the CPB according to the following form: 
 
 𝑌𝑌it = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 ∗  𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 ∗  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 ∗  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽3𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 ∗  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡   (1)  




For model (1) we analyze the relationship between the home game day and presence of extra innings at 
different levels of geography (geographic units denoted by i) around CBP for a given day (denoted by t) 
on the count of crime (Yit). The interaction term (𝛽𝛽1) provides the treatment effect estimate of the extra 
innings during home game days on crime surrounding CBP stadium.  The regression model also accounts 
for potentially higher crime in the CBP area on home game days (𝛽𝛽2) generally (i.e., whether there are 
extra innings or not), and it accounts for potentially higher crime around CBP during extra-innings games 
(𝛽𝛽3) even when the game is away. This latter effect is necessary since we define the span of a day as 
running from the time of the first pitch to the time of the last out plus one hour. Because of this, extra 
inning game days will mechanically generate more crime simply because the window of time is longer.  
The model also includes separate fixed effect dummies for every day in the sample to control for period 
effects, and separate fixed effects for each geographic unit to allow for differential crime baselines by 
area.  
We use only days during the baseball regular season (April – October) and drop days entirely if 
the Philadelphia Phillies played a double header (24 days) or a game that had any rain delay time (54 




We use incident report based crime data provided by the Philadelphia Police Department.11 These data 
cover each crime reported in the city and include both location data (latitude and longitude as well as 
street block) and the date and time the crime is reported. The data are available starting in 2006 and are 
updated regularly. Our analyses cover the 2006 through the 2015 baseball season. We aggregate total 
crime counts and subcategories (assault, theft, liquor violations, disorderly conduct) to the Philadelphia 
 
11 https://www.opendataphilly.org/dataset/crime-incidents 
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Police Department’s Police Service Areas (PSA) as our primary geographic unit of analysis.12 We include 
the entire PSA in which the CBP stadium is located (District 3; PSA 3)13 as our primary treatment area.  In 
separate analyses, we also aggregate crime counts on game days to the Census Block level14 to focus 
more tightly on the area just around the stadium. The Census designation effectively covers the stadium 
and its nearby parking lots, but this means the eastern boundary is coincident with the wall of the 
stadium and, therefore, does not capture any crimes committed to the east of the stadium. Although 
the Census blocks are a sensible unit for measuring crime around CBP, in addition to this eastern 
boundary problem, it also includes the Philadelphia Eagles practice facility which is inaccessible to the 
public (West of Broad Street).   
To provide an additional geographic measure of crime, we also aggregate crime to the natural 
transportation nodes around CBP as another treatment unit. Three of these boundaries are major 
highways or arterial roads (I-95 is 1900 feet to the South of the CBP southern wall, I-76 is 1500 feet to 
the North of the CBP northern wall, and Broad Street is 1500 feet to the West of the CBP western wall).  
The approach of counting crime around a node network is consistent with studies that use road 
networks to examine the spatial patterns of crime (Davis & Johnson, 2015). Only the eastern boundary 
has no comparable transportation border. For the eastern boundary, we measured 1500 feet from the 
eastern CBP wall. Any crime that occurred within the CBP PSA but outside of this boundary was assigned 
to a separate geographic unit. We perform analyses on this natural CBP geographic unit as compared to 
all other PSAs in the city. 
 
12 There are 66 PSAs in Philadelphia.  PSAs are police patrol boundaries within police districts that were designed to 
be reflective of neighborhood boundaries as part of the Philadelphia Police Department’s shift to community 
police.   
13 https://www.phillypolice.com/districts/3rd/index.html 
14 Citizens Bank Park is located in Census Tract Code 9806.00; see 
https://www2.census.gov/geo/maps/dc10map/tract/st42_pa/c42101_philadelphia/DC10CT_C42101_003.pdf. 
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 To provide an additional comparison, we also measured boundaries of comparable dimensions 
around popular sports bars in Philadelphia. These bars draw Phillies fans on game nights but do not stop 
selling alcoholic beverages at the end of the seventh inning. This comparison allows us to examine 
whether game-specific dynamics (e.g., especially exciting games) affect crime among drinking sports 
fans independent of the alcohol service policy in ways that might be coincidentally related to game 
duration. Admittedly, any choice of what sports bars to compare with CBP will be arbitrary. While the 
choice of sports bars is ad hoc, any game-induced drinking and crime effect should be exhibited around 
the most sports bars. 
To aggregate across time, we defined the relevant time period for each day’s crime as being the 
time of the game’s first pitch through one hour after the end of the game.15 For days where no game 
was played, we define the time window as 7 p.m. to 11 p.m. which approximates the standard window 
for game days. In subsequent analyses, we expanded this window to three hours after the end of the 
game and five hours after the end of the game. For away games, which we use as comparators in some 
analyses, we used the same timing approach but shift the time if the game was played outside of the 
Eastern Time Zone. We drop days in which double headers are played and those that were delayed 
because of rain.16 We only examine days during baseball’s regular season, omitting pre-season games 
and playoff games.  
The available data on baseball games does not provide a specific time when innings begin (other 
than the 1st) or end (other than the last). There is no way from public data to measure how much of a 
game’s duration occurs after the seventh inning. To address this limitation, we measure game length 
 
15 The generally available baseball game data have a specific time of first pitch and a total time of game from the 
first pitch to the final out, but do not include a time of the last out.  To determine the time of the last out, we 
added the game time to the first pitch time. 
16 The generally available baseball statistics do not note which games have rain delays.  We purchased information 
on rain delay time from Stats Perform (formerly Stats LLC), a data provider for MLB.  From 2006-2015, the Phillies 
played 54 games where there was non-zero rain delay time. 
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using two proxies. First, we examine whether the game goes into extra innings because the score was 
tied at the end of the 9th inning. Extra-inning games are substantially longer, clocking in at an average of 
226 minutes compared to 172 minutes for games without extra innings. The difference in almost one 
hour, allowing an average person the ability to process about one more alcoholic drink,17 suggesting that 
some share of spectators could sober up and reduce the effects of alcohol consumption crime. Second, 
we include a measure of the number of pitches thrown after the seventh inning as a proxy for the length 
of the game after alcohol sales cease. The number of pitches thrown in an inning is a good proxy for 
duration, as the correlation coefficient between the duration of a game and total pitches thrown 




Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for crime counts per day the CBP PSA and all other PSAs for both 
the baseball season period and year-round. While crime is generally only a little higher during baseball 
season throughout the city, the increase is much larger in the CBP PSA. 
 
Table 1: Daily Crime Descriptive Statistics (All Philadelphia PSAs v. Citizens Bank Park PSA) 
Time Period Equals Game Start Time Through Game End Time Plus One Hour for Game Days 
Time Period Equals 7 p.m. through 11 p.m. for Non-Game Days 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
 All PSAs CBP PSA All PSAs CBP PSA 
 Year Round Baseball Season 









































17 See, for example, https://www.nhs.uk/common-health-questions/lifestyle/how-long-does-alcohol-stay-in-your-
blood/ 
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Note:  Data provided by Philadelphia Police Department and available publicly at 
https://www.opendataphilly.org/dataset/crime-incidents.  Data cover 2006-2015.  Baseball Season 
covers April through October.  Only regular season games are included in game data.  Game days that 
include a double header or games with rain delay time are excluded from the data (X out of Y total 
games). For games played in the Eastern time zone, the time period covered is the time of the first 
pitch to the end of the game plus one hour.  For games played in different time zones, the time period 
covered is the time of the first pitch converted to Eastern time through the end of the game plus one 
hour.  For non-game days, the time period covers 7:00 p.m. to 11 p.m. 
 
A comparison of crime in the CBP PSA during home and away games might be informative, since 
the cut-off policy is only relevant for home games. That said, since the time window for aggregating 
crimes is dependent on the length of the game (and if baseline crime rates differ according to the time 
of day), it is important that the length of a game and start times be comparable. Table 2 provides 
descriptive statistics about Phillies games during our sample period broken down by home and away 
games. For most measures, home and away games are comparable in length, number of pitches after 
the seventh inning, and start time. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Phillies Games (Home v. Away) 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
 Home Away 




















Start Time – mode 7:07 p.m. 7:09 p.m. 
Games – total 741 778 
Extra Inning Games – total 75 81 
Note:  Data compiled from https://www.baseball-reference.com/teams/PHI/ game logs. Data cover 
2006-2015. Only regular season games are included in game data.  Game days that include a double 
header or games with rain delay time are excluded from the data.  
   
Table 3 shows crimes per day for home and away games. While there is not much difference 
throughout Philadelphia in comparing crime during home games and during away games, the crime 
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appears to be 46% higher in the CBP PSA during home game days (3.87) than during days when the 
game is away (2.65). This pattern of elevated crime counts around CPB on home game days is also 
apparent for assaults, theft, liquor violations, and disorderly conduct. 
 
Table 3: Gameday Daily Crime Descriptive Statistics (Home Game Days v. Away Game Days) 
Time Period Equals Game Start Time Through Game End Time Plus One Hour 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
 All PSAs CBP PSA All PSAs CBP PSA 
 Home Game Days Away Game Days 








































Note:  Data provided by Philadelphia Police Department and available publicly at 
https://www.opendataphilly.org/dataset/crime-incidents.  Data cover 2006-2015.  Baseball Season 
covers April through October.  Only regular season games are included in game data.  Game days that 
include a double header or games with rain delay time are excluded from the data. For games played 
in the Eastern time zone, the time period covered is the time of the first pitch to the end of the game 
plus one hour.  For games played in different time zones, the time period covered is the time of the 
first pitch converted to Eastern time through the end of the game plus one hour.   
 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for crime in the CBP PSA comparing 9 inning games to 
extra innings, and home and away games. The home and away comparison is important because the 
extra-inning games will include a longer time window in total, which could mechanically increase the 
crime counts. The difference in counts between extra-inning games and 9 inning games for away games 
provides some calibration for this expanding window effect. 
 
Table 4: Gameday Daily Crime Descriptive Statistics – CBP PSA (9 Inning Games v. Extra Inning Games) 
Time Period Equals Game Start Time Through Game End Time Plus One Hour 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
 9 Innings Extra Innings 9 Innings Extra Innings 
 Home Game Days Away Game Days 
Total Crime 3.81 4.40 2.57 3.33 
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Note:  Data provided by Philadelphia Police Department and available publicly at 
https://www.opendataphilly.org/dataset/crime-incidents.  Data cover 2006-2015.  Baseball Season 
covers April through October.  Only regular season games are included in game data.  Game days that 
include a double header or games with rain delay time are excluded from the data. For games played 
in the Eastern time zone, the time period covered is the time of the first pitch to the end of the game 
plus one hour.  For games played in different time zones, the time period covered is the time of the 
first pitch converted to Eastern time through the end of the game plus one hour.  Data only cover the 
PSA that includes Citizens Bank Park. 
  
While crime in the CBP PSA is higher at home for extra-inning games than it is for 9 inning 
games, the proportional increase of 15% is about half as large (4.4/3.81=1.15) as the same comparison 
for away game days (3.33/2.57=1.30). Looking at specific crimes, it appears as though assaults are the 
most affected crime category. Assaults rise by only 16% on home game days with extra innings 
compared to 71% for away games with extra innings. This is consistent with much of the literature 
previously reviewed that suggests assaults are particularly sensitive to alcohol consumption and the 
policies used to influence that consumption. These increases in assault, however, is only an illustration 




Table 5 provides results from our regression specifications of total crime, assaults, thefts, liquor 
violations and disorderly conduct at the PSA level and how they vary with different specifications. The 
results show a general decline in crime around the CPB stadium on days when home games go into extra 
innings, but we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference at a p<0.05. Relative to the average 
number of assaults in the CBP PSA on days when the home game does not go into extra innings, this 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3567418
19 
 
represents a decline of about one quarter. Thefts and liquor violations also decline by a statistically 
significant amount of around p=.10 and p.=.02 respectively. Disorderly conduct violations, however, 
increase significantly.  
Recent work18 suggests reasons to be concerned with standard inference approaches when 
there are few treatment areas in difference-in-differences estimators, likely resulting in an under-
rejection of the null hypothesis. With this in mind, we present two-sided 10% critical values19 that arise 
from running the regressions repeatedly (65 times; one for each PSA) and using each non-CBP PSA as a 
placebo treatment geographic unit. This approach is often referred to as randomization inference 
(MacKinnon & Webb, 2018) or permutation tests for generating a reference distribution, and date back 
to Fisher’s idea of exact inference (Ernst, 2004).20 
 
Table 5: Effect of Extra Innings on Crime 
(Standard Errors Clustered at PSA Level) 
{Two-Sided 10% Critical Values from Placebo Regressions} 
 
 Dependent Variable [Mean for CBP PSA Below] 
 Total Crime Assaults Theft Liquor Disorder 
 [3.15] [0.56] [0.30] [0.20] [0.13] 
 Extra Inning * Home Game * CBP PSA Coefficients 
By Specifications/Sample Restrictions 
All Days Included; 

















Only Game Days 
Included; No Length 
















All Days Included; 
Length of Game 
















Only Game Days 












18 See, for example, Conley and Taber (2011); Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008); and MacKinnon and Webb 
(2019). 
19 We present the placebo coefficients, though the inferences are generally unchanged if we use the t statistics 
preferred by MacKinnon and Webb (2019). 
20 Randomization inference or permutation tests are increasingly being used in criminology applications like this 
one (see Kurland et al., 2014; Ridgeway & MacDonald, 2017). 





{-0.60, 0.63} {-0.21, 0.24} {-0.17, 0.13} {-0.10, 0.13} {-0.08, 0.10} 
Note: Each cell represents the coefficient on the treatment interaction (Extra Inning * Home Game * 
CBP PSA) from a separate regression.  In addition to this treatment interaction, each regression 
includes the Extra Inning * CBP PSA and Home Game * CBP PSA interactions, as well as fixed effects 
for each PSA and for each separate calendar day.  In the regressions where length of game controls 
are included, the following interactions are included in each regression: Game Length * Home Game * 
CBP PSA and Game Length * CBP PSA. 
 
Data cover 2006-2015.  Only regular season games are included in game data.  Game days that 
include a double header or games with rain delay time are excluded from the data. For games played 
in the Eastern time zone, the time period covered is the time of the first pitch to the end of the game 
plus one hour.  For games played in different time zones, the time period covered is the time of the 
first pitch converted to Eastern time through the end of the game plus one hour.  For non-game days, 
the time period covers 7:00 p.m. to 11 p.m. Standard errors clustered at PSA level. 
 
*** p < 0.01 (against two-tailed test of zero effect) 
** p < 0.05 (against two-tailed test of zero effect) 
* p < 0.10 (against two-tailed test of zero effect) 
 
Table 5 also shows results that when the regressions are restricted to only game days. For this 
specification the comparison now places the 9th inning vs extra inning differential for a home game 
against the same differential for away games. Using this comparison, the coefficients barely change. In 
this comparison, the effect on total crime is statistically significant and represents about a 5% reduction 
in total crime.   
Finally, table 5 shows results when the length of the game is controlled for. Longer games 
generate larger time windows which could mechanically measure more crime. While our comparisons 
with windows of the same duration in other areas of Philadelphia accounts for this, there may be 
heterogeneity in the time profile of crimes such that the CBP area sees more of its crime earlier in the 
day than do other areas. Accounting for the total duration of the game leads to larger decreases in the 
total crime effect, the effect on assaults, and the effect on liquor violations. This is true whether we 
include non-game days or not. However, as can be seen by the placebo critical values, standard 
inference approaches likely lead to over-rejection of the null effect. Using an empirical placebo 
distribution for inference, only the effects estimated for assaults are particularly large in magnitude.   
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Focusing on extra innings, in some sense, leaves variation unexploited. As seen in Figure 1, while 
extra inning games are generally longer than 9 inning games, there is substantial overlap in the 
distributions of game duration. 
 
While it is not possible, using public data, to parse out how much game time occurs after the 
seventh inning, it is possible to know how many pitches were thrown by inning. Because there is a high 
correlation between pitches thrown and the game’s duration (ρ > 0.92), we can use pitches as a time 
proxy, which we do in Table 6.21  For these regressions, the treatment effect is the interaction of Pitches 
Thrown After the 7th Inning * Home Game * CBP PSA.  These regressions also include the interactions 
Pitches Thrown After the 7th Inning * CBP PSA and Home Game * CBP PSA, as well as the PSA and day 
specific fixed effects.  To account for overall length, we also include Total Pitches Thrown * Home Game 
* CBP PSA and Total Pitches Thrown * CBP PSA.  Given the earlier results, we focus only on assaults.  The 
 











100 200 300 400 500
9 Innings Extra Innings
9 Innings vs. Extra Innings
Figure 1: Game Length (in minutes)
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3567418
22 
 
importance of assaults in the existing literature likewise suggests assaults are a sensible place to focus 
our attention.  
Table 6: Effect of Pitches After 7th Inning on Assaults 
(Standard Errors Clustered at PSA Level) 
{Two-Sided 10% Critical Values from Placebo Regressions} 
  
 Game Days Only 
Pitches After 7th Inning * Home 




Implied Reduction in Assaults 
for Average Game 
-0.25 
Implied Percentage Reduction 45% 
Note: Each cell represents the coefficient on the treatment interaction (Pitches After 7th Inning * 
Home Game * CBP PSA) from a separate regression.  In addition to this treatment interaction, each 
regression includes the Pitches After 7th Inning * CBP PSA and Home Game * CBP PSA interactions.  
Each regression also includes the interactions Total Pitches * Home Game * CBP PSA and Total Pitches 
* CBP PSA, as well as fixed effects for each PSA and for each separate calendar day 
 
Data cover 2006-2015.  Only regular season games are included in game data.  Game days that 
include a double header or games with rain delay time are excluded from the data. For games played 
in the Eastern time zone, the time period covered is the time of the first pitch to the end of the game 
plus one hour.  For games played in different time zones, the time period covered is the time of the 
first pitch converted to Eastern time through the end of the game plus one hour.  For non-game days, 
the time period covers 7:00 p.m. to 11 p.m. Standard errors clustered at PSA level. 
 
*** p < 0.01 (against two-tailed test of zero effect) 
** p < 0.05 (against two-tailed test of zero effect) 
* p < 0.10 (against two-tailed test of zero effect) 
  
We estimate that each pitch thrown after the 7th inning reduces assaults by almost 0.004. Given 
that, on average, there are 68 pitches thrown after the alcohol policy goes into effect, this implies a 
reduction in assaults of about 0.25, which is a proportionate reduction of almost one half. This effect is 
statistically significant using the standard approach to inference.  Comparison to the distribution of 
placebo effects likewise suggests this effect was unlikely to have arisen by chance alone. 
Philadelphia provides us with another source of variation. As discussed above, once Xfinity Live! 
Opens in March 2012, any benefits of the stadium’s alcohol cut-off are likely to be undone as spectators 
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now can now buy alcohol a few steps from the stadium no matter what inning it is. Table 7 shows results 
focusing on assaults, allowing for differential effects before and after the 2012 baseball season. We 
implement this in two different ways. First, we interact each of the previous effects with a dummy 
variable for whether Xfinity Live! was open or not.  Secondly, we provide results where we split the 
sample into the pre-2012 period and the 2012 onward period.  Both approaches yield the same 
implication. The effects we previously observed largely disappear once Xfinity Live! opens. 
 
Table 7: Assault Effect Before and After Xfinity Live Opens 
(Standard Errors Clustered at PSA Level) 
{Two-Sided 10% Critical Values from Placebo Regressions} 
 Full Sample 
 
Full Sample Before 2012 After 2012 
Late Pitches * 











Late Pitches * 
Home * CBP * 









with Indicator for 
Xfinity Live Open 
No Yes No No 
PSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day Specific Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Non Game Days 
Included 
No No No No 
Note: Data cover 2006-2015.  Only regular season games are included in game data.  Game days that 
include a double header or games with rain delay time are excluded from the data. For games played 
in the Eastern time zone, the time period covered is the time of the first pitch to the end of the game 
plus one hour.  For games played in different time zones, the time period covered is the time of the 
first pitch converted to Eastern time through the end of the game plus one hour.  Xfinity Live opened 
in the South Philadelphia Sports Complex (which includes Citizens Bank Park) parking lot in March 
2012. Standard errors clustered at PSA level. 
*** p < 0.01 (against two-tailed test of zero effect) 
** p < 0.05 (against two-tailed test of zero effect) 
* p < 0.10 (against two-tailed test of zero effect) 
 
In the regression with the interaction, the pre-2012 effect of pitches after the 7th inning is completely 
offset by the 2012 onward effect of pitches after the 7th inning. In the split sample regressions, we 
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observe our treatment effect in the pre-2012 sample, but we do not observe it in the sample covering 





Table 8 provides estimates when the sample is split by weekend games (Friday-Saturday), 
weekday games (Sunday-Thursday), night games, when the Phillies win or lose, when a geographically 
close opponent is played, by attendance levels,22 and whether the game is tight.23  All estimates are 
presented for the full sample and before the opening of Xfinity Live.  
 
Table 8: Heterogeneity in Assault Effect 
(Standard Errors Clustered at PSA Level) 
{Two-Sided 10% Critical Values from Placebo Regressions} 
 Full Sample Before Xfinity Live! 










































Phillies Lose -0.004*** -0.003*** 
 
22 The 75th percentile attendance level in CBP is 45,135. 
23 We define a tight game as one that ends with a score differential of three runs or fewer.  This tracks MLB’s 
definition of a “close” game for the purposes of defining a save opportunity. 































Note: Each cell provides the coefficient on the “Late Pitches * Home * CBP PSA” term and each 
regression includes controls for “Late Pitches * CBP PSA,” “Home * CBP PSA,” “Total Pitches * Home * 
CBP PSA,” and “Total Pitches * CBP PSA” terms, as well as date specific fixed effects and PSA specific 
fixed effects.  Data cover 2006-2015.  Only regular season games are included in game data.  Game 
days that include a double header or games with rain delay time are excluded from the data. Non 
game days are excluded.  For games played in the Eastern time zone, the time period covered is the 
time of the first pitch to the end of the game plus one hour.  For games played in different time zones, 
the time period covered is the time of the first pitch converted to Eastern time through the end of the 
game plus one hour. Xfinity Live opened in the South Philadelphia Sports Complex (which includes 
Citizens Bank Park) parking lot in March 2012.  Geographically close opponents are the New York 
Mets, the New York Yankees, the Baltimore Orioles, and the Washington Nationals. The time window 
for each day includes the full span of the game plus 1 hour. Standard errors clustered at PSA level. 
*** p < 0.01 (against two-tailed test of zero effect) 
** p < 0.05 (against two-tailed test of zero effect) 
* p < 0.10 (against two-tailed test of zero effect) 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, we see larger effects for nighttime and weekend games when, 
presumably, people are more inclined to drink excessively. There is some evidence that the effect is 
larger when the Phillies win and when they play a geographically close opponent, though we do not 
have much intuition for these results. 
The differential attendance effects make sense as, presumably, more crowded games generate 
more social interaction. The fact that our result is larger in tight games is also helpful for building 
confidence that our result is driven by the alcohol sales restriction. One concern might be that as games 
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last longer, people leave the CBP area before the end of the game, mechanically lowering assaults.  
Presumably the potential for this is less when a game is more competitive.     
 
Time Range of Effect 
 In the foregoing analyses, the time range studied on each game day runs from the time of the 
first pitch to the time of the last out plus 1 hour. Such analyses presume that any effect of the stadium 
alcohol policy will be temporally compact. To examine whether our estimated effect extends further in 
time, we re-run the basic regression allowing also for time windows that add 3 hours and 5 hours to the 
end of the game. The estimates of the basic treatment effects for each of these windows are presented 
in Figure 2 below. 
 
 The confidence intervals for the coefficients using each of the three-time windows are over-
lapping, suggesting that the effect of the stadium alcohol policy on assaults is concentrated during the 













+1 Hour +3 Hours +5 Hours
95% Confidence Interval Coefficient
Assault Effects By Different Time Windows
Figure 2:




Geographic Range of Effect 
 Until this point, we performed our analyses at the pre-defined Philadelphia Police PSA level.  
While this approach has the benefit of using pre-determined geographic units of analysis, the PSA is, in a 
sense, over-inclusive, since it includes city blocks that are quite far from CBP. We constructed a CBP 
treatment area that better approximated the natural boundaries of the stadium. We aggregate crime in 
the area around the ballpark between I-76 in the North, I-95 in the South, Broad Street to the West, and 
a 1500 feet distance to the East. We then allocate all of the residual crime in CBP’s PSA to its own 
geographic unit and keep all of the other PSAs constant. This re-organizing of the data allows us to 
construct a tighter boundary around the ballpark, perhaps shoring up confidence that any observed 
effect is driven by the drinking policy.   
Table 9 shows results of regressions using this bespoke CBP boundary. The implied relative 
reduction in assault rates is larger than the one observed when the entire PSA is taken as the treatment 
area, suggesting that the assault generating effects of alcohol consumption in the stadium are highly 
localized.24 
 
Table 9: Assault Effect in Tighter Area Around Citizens Bank Park 
(Standard Errors Clustered at PSA Level) 
 Full Sample Before Xfinity Live 






Implied Reduction in Assaults 
for Average Game 
-0.06 -0.08 






Percentage Effect for Average 
Number of Pitches After 7th 
Inning 
-58% -64% 
Note: Each regression includes controls for “Late Pitches * CBP,” “Home * CBP,” “Total Pitches * 
Home * CBP,” and “Total Pitches * CBP” terms, as well as date specific fixed effects and area specific 
 
24 Given that the bespoke CBP area is substantially smaller than other PSAs (and has much less crime than virtually 
all of the PSAs due to its small area), we do not think the placebo inference approach is sensible with this analysis. 
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fixed effects.  Data cover 2006-2015.  Only regular season games are included in game data.  Game 
days that include a double header or games with rain delay time are excluded from the data. Non 
game days are excluded.  For games played in the Eastern time zone, the time period covered is the 
time of the first pitch to the end of the game plus one hour.  For games played in different time zones, 
the time period covered is the time of the first pitch converted to Eastern time through the end of the 
game plus one hour.  Xfinity Live opened in the South Philadelphia Sports Complex (which includes 
Citizens Bank Park) parking lot in March 2012.  The area around Citizens Bank Park goes West to 
Broad Street, South to I-95, North to I-76, and East for 1 mile.  All Comparison PSAs are used, 
including the residual of the PSA that includes Citizens Bank Park. 
*** p < 0.01 (against two-tailed test of zero effect) 
** p < 0.05 (against two-tailed test of zero effect) 
* p < 0.10 (against two-tailed test of zero effect) 
 
 While the results using the more natural CBP boundary are consistent with our previous results 
and suggest that the assault effects are tightly concentrated around the stadium, our analysis is not 
exactly an apples-to-apples one since the comparison geographic units are significantly larger than our 
custom CBP unit. To address this, and to add a potentially more appropriate set of comparators, we 
defined comparable boundaries around 10 popular sports bars throughout Philadelphia. Table 10 
presents the results from the sports bars comparisons with comparable geographic boundaries. 
   
Table 10: Assault Effect in CBP Area Compared With Sports Bars 
(Standard Errors Clustered at Bar Level) 
 Full Sample Before Xfinity Live 






Note: Each regression includes controls for “Late Pitches * CBP,” “Home * CBP,” “Total Pitches * 
Home * CBP,” and “Total Pitches * CBP” terms, as well as date specific fixed effects and bar area 
specific fixed effects.  Data cover 2006-2015.  Only regular season games are included in game data.  
Game days that include a double header or games with rain delay time are excluded from the data. 
Non game days are excluded for games played in the Eastern time zone, the time period covered is 
the time of the first pitch to the end of the game plus one hour.  For games played in different time 
zones, the time period covered is the time of the first pitch converted to Eastern time through the 
end of the game plus one hour.    Xfinity Live opened in the South Philadelphia Sports Complex (which 
includes Citizens Bank Park) parking lot in March 2012.  The area around Citizens Bank Park goes West 
to Broad Street, South to I-95, North to I-76, and East for 1 mile.  Comparisons are similar distances in 
each direction around the following sports bars: Cavanaugh’s (Center City); Cavanaugh’s (University 
City); Chickie’s and Pete’s (Robbins Avenue); Chickie’s and Pete’s (Roosevelt Avenue); Garage 
Fishtown; Leneghan’s Crusader Inn (Northeast); the Manayunk Tavern; McGillin’s Olde Ale House 
(Center City); Pub Webb (North Philadelphia); and Standard Tap (Northern Liberties). Standard errors 
clustered on bar area. 
*** p < 0.01 (against two-tailed test of zero effect) 
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** p < 0.05 (against two-tailed test of zero effect) 
* p < 0.10 (against two-tailed test of zero effect) 
 
We find comparable statistically significant negative effects25 on assault even in this more tightly 
constructed comparison of sports bars.  Since sports bars do not halt the sale of alcohol after the 
seventh inning, but are populated with sports fans, this comparison has the potential to account for any 
game-specific dynamics that could be related to assaults and whether the game extends for a long time 
after the seventh inning. 
For one last alternate geographic unit definition, Table 11 shows the results when we aggregate 
crime counts to the Census block level. While Census blocks have the advantage of being pre-
determined, and they are tighter areas than the previously examined PSAs, the CBP Census block is not 
ideal since it includes a largely inaccessible area (the Eagles Nova Care Practice Complex), while severely 
restricting the eastern boundary of the CBP area.26 That notwithstanding, the results again show that 
assaults decline around CBP as games go longer after the seventh inning. In addition to comparing CBP 
with all other Census blocks, we also attempt to examine more appropriate comparators by looking at 
Census blocks that might be frequented by drinkers. To construct these comparisons, we look at Census 
blocks that have more than the mean number of total liquor licenses (8) associated with addresses in 
the Census block and those Census blocks that have at least one restaurant-based liquor license.27 
 
Table 11: Assault Effect in CBP Census Block 
(Standard Errors Clustered at PSA Level) 
{Two-Sided 10% Critical Values from Placebo Regressions} 
 Full Sample Before Xfinity Live 
Late Pitches * Home * CBP Census Block 






25 Though the small number of bars limits the usefulness of a permutation inference approach here, it is possibly 
worth noting that the CBP effect is more negative than every placebo effect in the pre-2012 analysis.  It is more 
negative than all but the effect estimated for McGillin’s Olde Ale House when the entire time span is analyzed. 
26 The Census block eastern boundary is essentially the eastern wall of CBP. 
27 Many overall liquor licenses are assigned to social organizations that might not actually imply a high level of 
drinking (e.g., church groups), whereas restaurant-based liquor licenses likely indicate a consistent amount of 
drinking in the area. 
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{-0.0006, 0.0005} {-0.0007, 0.0007} 
Late Pitches * Home * CBP Census Block 








Late Pitches * Home * CBP Census Block 








Note: Each cell represents the coefficient from a different regression.  Each regression includes 
controls for “Late Pitches * CBP Census Block,” “Home * CBP Census Block,” “Total Pitches * Home * 
CBP Census Block,” and “Total Pitches * CBP Census Block” terms, as well as date specific fixed effects 
and census block specific fixed effects.  Data cover 2006-2015.  Only regular season games are 
included in game data.  Game days that include a double header or games with rain delay time are 
excluded from the data. Non game days are excluded.  For games played in the Eastern time zone, the 
time period covered is the time of the first pitch to the end of the game plus one hour.  For games 
played in different time zones, the time period covered is the time of the first pitch converted to 
Eastern time through the end of the game plus one hour.  Xfinity Live opened in the South 
Philadelphia Sports Complex (which includes Citizens Bank Park) parking lot in March 2012.  Standard 
errors clustered on Census Block. 
*** p < 0.01 (against two-tailed test of zero effect) 
** p < 0.05 (against two-tailed test of zero effect) 
* p < 0.10 (against two-tailed test of zero effect) 
 
 When examining the Census blocks, we again find that game time after the seventh inning is 
associated with a statistically significant reduction in assaults. The implied proportionate reduction in 
assaults is even larger than that implied in our previous analyses.  This is true on average (an 89% 
reduction) and when we focus on Census blocks with a relatively high number of liquor licenses 
associated with them (an 87% reduction when compared to blocks with more than 8 total liquor licenses 




This paper set out to examine the relationship between alcohol consumption and crime around 
a sports stadium. The seventh inning last call on alcohol sales provides a natural experiment to examine 
alcohol consumption and crime around a sports stadium. The un-timed nature of baseball games means 
that at some home games fans will have hours to sober up from drinking, whereas in others they may 
have only minutes from the last drink to they depart from the stadium. Philadelphia offered an 
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additional natural experiment in that the Xfinity Live! complex opened in 2012 effectively undoing the 
limit on alcohol sales near the stadium. Our analysis included multiple comparisons of crime around the 
CBP stadium, all showing that assault offenses generally drop on home game days that extend into 
extra-innings. The effects are most pronounced at time windows closest to the end of the game, and the 
effect appears to be undone by the arrival of Xfinity Live! that allows fans to continue to purchase and 
drink alcohol on the stadium grounds. Like other crime and place studies (Kurland & Johnson, 2019), we 
examine crime at multiple geographic levels, which allows us to see how robust the results are to 
different levels of aggregation.   
Considering that assaults are considerably higher on game days near the CPB stadium when 
alcohol consumption and the end of the game are closer in time, this suggests that alcohol is a generator 
of assaults around the stadium that result in calls to the police. This effect is clear given that we see no 
similar reduction in crime around sports bars or other areas of Philadelphia when games go relatively 
long after the seventh inning. This work extends other research in suggesting that sports stadiums are 
crime generators (Billings & Depken, 2011; Kurland, 2014; Marie, 2016; Kurkland & Johnson, 2019; 
Vandeviver et al., 2019; Campaniello, 2013; Munyo & Rossi, 2013), an effect that is likely enhanced by 
alcohol consumption. Stadiums with alcohol may then be considered one of many episodic crime 
generators in a city, much like bars that serve multiple drinks to patrons just before closing and let 
crowds hang around outside after closing (Graham et al. 2006; Graham & Homel, 2012). These results 
lend further support for environmental criminology theories that emphasize situational opportunities 
that increase the risk for criminal offenses (Wilcox & Cullen, 2019). Like the work by others that find 
sports stadiums are facilitators of crime nearby (Kurland & Johnson, 2019), this work suggests that 
serving alcohol during MLB games closer the end of the game generates crime at stadiums around home 
games.   
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This study suggests policy implications for the curtailing violence associated with drinking 
alcohol at baseball games. Considering the influence that serving alcohol closer to the end of the game 
has for amplifying assaults on home game days, with no evidence of similar effects elsewhere in 
Philadelphia, this implies a few potential avenues for policy. One implication is that more effort may be 
needed to minimize loitering of drunk people outside of the stadium at the end of the game. 
Additionally, the presence of police in specific locations outside the stadium that are more often the 
presence of assaults may be warranted. Reducing queuing outside bars with rowdy patrons has been 
noted as an effective approach to reducing assaults (Graham & Homel, 2012). And hot spot policing 
experiments shows that placing police temporarily in high crime locations helps thwart crime (Weisburd 
et al., 2012). Whether such approaches would be effective for reducing assaults around MLB stadiums 
warrants controlled field experiments, as both approaches may prove to be less costly than curtailing 
alcohol sales in stadiums.   
The estimates from this study suggest that the last call for alcohol sales at the end of the 
seventh inning leads to a reduction of 0.25 assaults per game on average. McCollister, French, and Fang 
(2010) estimate that the social cost of an assault ranges between $24,000 and $107,000. This implies a 
benefit per home game between $6,000 and $26,750 of ending alcohol sales in the seventh inning.28 For 
the cost of the policy, we need some estimate of the welfare loss of not being able to drink from the 
seventh inning through the end of the game. Erickson et al (2011) suggests that about half of attendees 
at professional football and baseball games report drinking at the game with little difference between 
the two sports in terms of likelihood of drinking or the volume drank. While data on alcohol sales at 
baseball games are scarce, one source suggests that the Indianapolis Colts sold $4 million in beer alone 
 
28 This number might need to be inflated to account for benefits of the policy beyond reduced assaults.  Although 
our analyses suggest effects on other crimes might be limited, we did not examine DUI effects given that our highly 
localized place-based identification strategy is not credible in the DUI context.  Carpenter and Dobkin’s (2011) 
review indicates that a number of studies find beneficial effects of alcohol restrictions on the incidence of DUIs.  
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in its 11 home games in 2013, yielding a per game average of $364,000. The Colts attendance in 2013 
was twice as large as Phillies attendance over the course of our sample. A back of the envelope estimate 
of sales per Phillies game could then be $180,000 per game, over 7 innings. This yields a per inning sales 
figure of $26,000. Adding two more innings of beer sales would suggest revenue gains of $52,000. For a 
welfare estimate, this number would need to be adjusted both for costs (cost of the beer itself, labor 
costs, etc.) and for consumer surplus (i.e., value derived from drinking the beer above the $6 average 
price at CBP). Taking a standard rule of thumb regarding profit margins on draft beer in the restaurant 
industry that suggests aiming for an 80 percent margin, even if consumers get zero surplus, the cost of 
the lost beer sales alone ($41,600) exceed the value of the assaults averted (< $27,000).  
Reducing assaults is important, but it also depends on how much social value society sees from 
drinking at baseball games. These estimates also imply that efforts at managing crowds and where 
drunk people congregate at the end of games may be more cost-effective than curtailing alcohol sales in 
earlier innings.  
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